Key Figures, Targets, Organisations and Judicial Outcomes

Period covered: 1 January 2000 – 31 December 2025

1. Introduction: a threat that predates Daesh

Extremist Islamist threats against people in Spain did not begin with the emergence of the Islamic State (Daesh) in 2014.

During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, organisations such as Al-Qaeda and associated networks issued threats against Spain, its institutions and people involved in counterterrorism. Later, the expansion of the Islamic State, propaganda in Spanish and the widespread use of social media changed the ways in which intimidation and the identification of targets were carried out.

The documentation consulted identifies threats against:

• Prime ministers and other political office-holders.
• Judges and magistrates of Spain’s National Court (Audiencia Nacional).
• Researchers and terrorism specialists.
• Journalists and university professors.
• Members of the National Police and the Civil Guard.
• Muslim women who defend positions opposed to extremism.
• Witnesses cooperating with the justice system.
• Western populations and religious communities.

One of the most important findings of this research is that the people targeted do not necessarily belong to the same ideological, political or religious group. In some cases they are representatives of the state; in others, Muslims who challenge extremism or people whose professional work involves researching or prosecuting it.

What do we mean by Islamist threats?

For this research, we use three distinct categories:

1. Threats by jihadist organisations. These come from groups that justify terrorist violence in the name of an extremist interpretation of Islam, such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh.
2. Threats by radicalised individuals. People who use extremist religious arguments to intimidate others, justify violence or issue death threats, even when membership of a terrorist organisation has not been established.
3. Threats by extremist Islamist organisations other than classic jihadist groups. These are included where there is documentation of the promotion of religious violence or the selection of targets, without automatically attributing their ideology to Daesh or Al-Qaeda.

This distinction is necessary. Not every radical religious statement constitutes terrorism, and not every threat justified through religious arguments proves membership of a jihadist organisation.

 

2. Historical overview: 25 years of documented threats

The following chronology brings together the main incidents identified. It distinguishes threats against specific people from those directed at groups or at Spain as a whole.

This table should not be interpreted as an official statistical register. It is a selection of cases and incidents documented in open sources.

 

3. First period (2000–2010): Al-Qaeda and threats against Spain and its institutions

3.1. 2000–2002: background and the difficulty of identifying jihadist threats

In the first years of the period, I have been unable to locate in the open sources consulted a sufficiently substantiated case of a direct jihadist threat against a specific person residing in Spain for which the course of events and outcome can be reconstructed.

This does not mean that there were no investigations into radical Islamist networks.

Indeed, Spain’s Constitutional Court documents judicial investigations into Al-Qaeda-linked networks in Spain, which began in the 1990s and were reopened from 2001 onwards. However, those proceedings do not in themselves constitute cases of personal threats.

Ruling: Constitutional Court Judgment 128/2011.

There is also a historical identification problem: some reports from those years refer to threats against judges and prosecutors, but those threats were made by ETA, not by jihadist terrorism.

 

3.2. 2003: Osama bin Laden explicitly threatens Spain

Threat against a country

Key figure: Osama bin Laden.
Organisation: Al-Qaeda.
Target: Spain and its interests.

On 19 October 2003, Osama bin Laden issued a message placing Spain among the countries that could face reprisals because of its participation in the Iraq war.

The message came amid the international context of the invasion of Iraq and the Spanish government’s support for the intervention led by the United States.

The warning did not identify a Spanish politician or citizen as an individual victim. It was directed against Spain as a country.

The historical importance of the statement is that Spanish territory and interests already featured in Al-Qaeda propaganda before the 11 March 2004 attacks.

The threat was reported by Spanish media and later appeared in analyses of the background to jihadist terrorism in Spain.

Outcome: there was no judicial proceeding against an identified person as the author of an individual threat. It was a propaganda statement issued by a terrorist organisation.

 

3.3. 2004: Al-Qaeda threats against the Spanish population

The 11 March attacks were a terrorist attack, not a threat that can be included as a personal-intimidation case. However, the communications that followed help explain the context of threats Spain faced.

On 3 April 2004, a statement attributed to Ansar Al-Qaeda in Europe claimed responsibility for the Madrid attacks and threatened to turn Spain into a hell if its policy of supporting the United States did not change.

On 8 April, another recording was released calling for the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.

On 15 April, Osama bin Laden issued a message linking the 9/11 and 11-M attacks to the policies of Western countries.

These communications were addressed to the Spanish population and government, not to a specific individual victim.

 

3.4. 2005: Al-Qaeda threatens judges of the National Court

Direct threat against the judiciary

Person publicly identified: Javier Gómez Bermúdez.
Group threatened: magistrates of the National Court.
Organisation responsible for the propaganda: Al-Qaeda.

What happened?

In October 2005, Al-Qaeda released two videos on the Internet showing a masked person who presented himself as a member of the organisation.

The recordings targeted the National Court judges who had convicted members of Al-Qaeda’s Spanish cell.

The reason for the threat was the judgment handed down against members of the organisation, including Al Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony.

The video criticised the Spanish justice system and threatened the judges who had taken part in the proceedings.

Who was affected?

Among the magistrates singled out was Javier Gómez Bermúdez, president of the panel that had convicted the cell members.

Gómez Bermúdez publicly stated that the threats would not change the judges’ approach.

Taysir Alony and his lawyer, José Luis Galán, also publicly condemned the threats, even though Alony had been one of the defendants convicted in those proceedings.

Who produced the video?

Reports at the time attributed it to Al-Qaeda and to a masked individual who claimed to be acting on behalf of the organisation.

I have not found a public judicial ruling that reliably identifies the producer or person materially responsible for the video.

How did the case end?

The threat attracted public attention and was confirmed by the authorities as an incident linked to Al-Qaeda propaganda.

However, I have been unable to locate a separate judicial proceeding that resulted in the identification and conviction of the person materially responsible for the threats.

Significance: this is a documented precedent of intimidation against Spanish judges for carrying out their duties in jihadist-terrorism proceedings.

 

3.5. 2007: Al-Qaeda threatens Spain over its military presence in Afghanistan

Threat against institutions and military forces

In March 2007, Al-Qaeda released a video on the Internet criticising Spanish foreign policy and threatening Spain because of its military presence in Afghanistan.

The organisation accused the Spanish government of withdrawing troops from Iraq while sending a further 600 soldiers to Afghanistan.

The message included warnings of reprisals against Western countries participating in military operations.

The Spanish government asked the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) to verify the recording’s authenticity. Defence Minister José Antonio Alonso confirmed that it had been disseminated through one of Al-Qaeda’s communication channels.

In December of that year, Ayman al-Zawahiri again referred explicitly to Al-Andalus, Ceuta and Melilla.

Key figure: Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Target: Spain, with specific references to Ceuta and Melilla.

In his message of 14 December 2007, he stated that he would not renounce armed struggle or the claim to Al-Andalus, Ceuta and Melilla.

These threats did not identify a specific person, but they are relevant to understanding the development of jihadist propaganda against Spain.

 

4. Second period (2011–2013): naming targets and threats before Daesh

4.1. 2011: Abdellatif Aoulad Chiba and the alleged plan involving water reservoirs

Plan initially attributed to him, followed by an acquittal

Person investigated: Abdellatif Aoulad Chiba.
Location: La Línea de la Concepción, Cádiz.
Organisation referenced in the investigation: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

What happened?

On 17 August 2011, Abdellatif Aoulad Chiba, a 36-year-old Moroccan citizen, was arrested in La Línea de la Concepción.

On 20 August, Judge Fernando Grande-Marlaska ordered that he be remanded in custody.

The initial investigation attributed to him an alleged plan to poison the water reservoirs supplying campsites and tourist complexes.

The prosecution and police were also investigating his activity on jihadist Internet forums, particularly Al Shumukh and Ansar Al Mujahideen.

Who would have been the targets?

According to the initial police hypothesis, the targets would have been the population supplied by the water reservoirs serving the tourist complexes.

No specific individuals were identified as victims.

The case is therefore included as an alleged plan against a civilian population, not as a personal threat directed at an individual.

What was the judicial outcome?

There is an important difference between the initial accusation and the judgment.

On 12 July 2013, the National Court sentenced Aoulad Chiba to two years in prison for the public dissemination of terrorist propaganda.

The prosecution documented that he had sworn allegiance to the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and had disseminated messages praising terrorist activities and calling for jihad.

However, he was acquitted of the alleged poisoning plan and of the charge of membership of a terrorist organisation, because the existence of a specific plan in the terms initially alleged was not proven.

Conclusion: this cannot be presented as a foiled attack or as a proven personal threat. It is an antiterrorism investigation whose judicial outcome differed substantially from the initial hypothesis.

 

4.2. 2012: Mudhar Hussein Almaliki, the “Al-Qaeda librarian”, names Aznar and Solana as targets

Naming political targets

Person investigated: Mudhar Hussein Almaliki.
Location: Valencia.
People singled out: José María Aznar and Javier Solana.

This is probably one of the clearest cases of Spanish public figures being named as targets in the period before Daesh.

Who was Mudhar Hussein Almaliki?

He was a 51-year-old Jordanian citizen living in Valencia.

He became known in the media as the “Al-Qaeda librarian” because of his activity on the Internet and the distribution of material related to jihadist ideology and terrorist training.

He managed forums and file-sharing websites through which he distributed jihadist propaganda.

Whom did he identify as targets?

According to the judicial order published by El País on 30 March 2012, Almaliki circulated a list of eight public figures whom he identified as possible targets of terrorist actions.

The list included:

1. José María Aznar, former Spanish prime minister.
2. Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO.
3. George H. W. Bush.
4. George W. Bush.
5. Barack Obama.
6. Bill Clinton.
7. Tony Blair.
8. Madeleine Albright.

The list was accompanied by statements justifying violence as a response to alleged crimes against Muslims.

How did the operation unfold?

Almaliki was arrested in Valencia on 27 March 2012.

Judge Pablo Ruz ordered his remand in custody.

The investigation found that he spent many hours a day managing forums connected with propaganda, indoctrination and recruitment.

He also distributed manuals on explosives, chemicals and terrorist procedures.

What was the outcome?

In May 2014, the National Court sentenced him to eight years in prison for membership of a terrorist organisation.

The judgment should not be confused with a separate conviction for personal threats against Aznar and Solana. The documented criminal liability was for membership of and integration into Al-Qaeda’s propaganda structure.

Conclusion: there is documentary and nominal identification of two former senior Spanish officials as targets in jihadist propaganda. The sources consulted do not establish that a physical attempt was made to attack them.

 

4.3. 2013: Mohamed Echaabi and the alleged plan against a senior Arab official in Spain

Alleged plan; outcome not located

Person investigated: Mohamed Echaabi.
Location: Valencia.

What happened?

In February 2013, the National Police arrested Mohamed Echaabi, a 22-year-old born in Morocco, in Valencia.

Judge Javier Gómez Bermúdez ordered his remand in custody.

According to information published by El País on 11 February 2013, the police investigation attributed to him an intention to carry out attacks in Spain and other European countries.

One of the targets mentioned was a senior official from an Arab country who was in Spain; his identity was not made public.

Investigators maintained that he had taken steps to obtain firearms and explosives.

Background

The press report also mentioned a trip to Egypt in 2011, allegedly with the intention of travelling to Gaza to attack Israeli interests.

He had also previously been arrested at the Tangier border crossing in April 2012.

These details appeared in the proceedings known to the judge and in the police investigation.

What was the outcome?

I have not located a final judgment or a sufficiently comprehensive public ruling that would establish the definitive outcome of the case.

His status should therefore remain that of an investigated person; we should not claim that the alleged plan was judicially proven.

Significance: this case shows that, before Daesh, Spanish counterterrorism investigations were already examining hypotheses about possible attacks against people identified by their institutional position.

 

5. Third period (2014–2019): the expansion of Daesh and threats through the Internet

5.1. 2015: letter containing death threats against Mariano Rajoy and Esperanza Aguirre

Direct threats against two political leaders

Person threatened: Mariano Rajoy, prime minister at the time.
Person threatened: Esperanza Aguirre, president of the Madrid branch of the People’s Party (PP).

What happened?

In September 2015, a letter addressed to Esperanza Aguirre arrived at the national headquarters of the People’s Party on Calle Génova in Madrid.

The letter was written in Spanish and Arabic and contained threats against Mariano Rajoy, Esperanza Aguirre and other party leaders.

It also announced the planting of bombs in Madrid and Barcelona, referring to transport infrastructure.

The communication was issued in the name of the Islamic State and referred to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Who was arrested?

On 26 October 2015, the National Police arrested two men identified in press reports by the initials J.E.H.B. and R.M.

The two had been in the same prison in Segovia and, according to the initial police information, had written the letter while serving their sentences.

What was the outcome?

The men were accused of threats for terrorist purposes.

We have been unable to locate a final judgment or public judicial ruling confirming the final outcome of this case.

 

5.2. 2015–2017: Ayoub Moutchou and threats against the National Police

Judicial conviction for terrorism-related offences

Identified person: Ayoub Moutchou.
Group threatened: the National Police.

Who was he?

Ayoub Moutchou was a young man born in Morocco and living in Figueres.

In August 2015, he was arrested in Germany as part of an investigation into his propaganda activities, radicalisation and contacts with people linked to the Islamic State.

What threats did he make?

The investigation collected repeated statements on social media in which he expressed his willingness to carry out an attack against Spain’s National Police.

The case was handled under the name Operation Amphitheatre.

The National Court Prosecutor’s Office expressly recorded in its annual report repeated statements expressing a desire to attack the National Police in Spain.

What was the outcome?

The trial took place on 7 February 2017, and the National Court sentenced him to eight years in prison.

The conviction concerned offences related to jihadist radicalisation, recruitment and self-indoctrination.

It is important not to describe the eight-year sentence as a standalone conviction for threats: the main basis for the sentence was his terrorist activity and radicalisation.

Conclusion: this is one of the clearest cases in which a judicial investigation expressly recorded a repeated intention to attack a specific group of Spanish public officials.

 

5.3. 2016–2019: Operation GRIN and threats against Fernando Reinares

Investigation ending in an acquittal for lack of evidence

Person threatened according to the investigation: Fernando Reinares, researcher and terrorism specialist at the Elcano Royal Institute.

Who was Karim El Idrissi Soussi?

Karim El Idrissi Soussi was a Spanish citizen born in Madrid to parents of Moroccan origin.

He was 27 when he was arrested in September 2016.

The National Police were investigating his radicalisation process, consumption of jihadist propaganda and communications on social media.

What threats were investigated?

The prosecution attributed to him threats against journalists and academics disseminated through Twitter.

Fernando Reinares was among the people mentioned as affected.

Reports also referred to threats against teachers and fellow students, including a statement about going into a classroom armed.

The investigation took place under Operation GRIN. Another young man, identified as O.S.A.A., was also arrested.

What was the judicial outcome?

In October 2019, the National Court acquitted Karim El Idrissi Soussi.

The prosecution had requested a sentence of up to 48 years in prison, but the court found insufficient evidence to establish the alleged offences.

Among other issues, it was not proven that the defendant was the author of certain accounts and messages from which the threats had been disseminated.

Karim must therefore not be presented as the person judicially proven to have made the threats against Fernando Reinares or the journalists.

Significance of the case

This case demonstrates two things:

• Researchers and academics specialising in terrorism can become targets of threats.
• Police and prosecutorial allegations must be distinguished from the facts a court ultimately finds proven.
•  

5.4. 2017–2018: threats against Civil Guard officers during Operation Malassa in Melilla

Conviction for public disorder, not terrorism

Identified individuals:

• Suliman Mohamed Makrani.
• Belaid Mohand Al-Lal.

Group threatened: Civil Guard officers.

What happened?

On 23 June 2017, the Civil Guard carried out an operation in Melilla against an environment connected to an investigation into jihadist recruitment and radicalisation.

During the police intervention, a group gathered around a house and disturbances took place.

Two young men, Suliman Mohamed Makrani and Belaid Mohand Al-Lal, shouted abuse at officers and made threatening statements.

The statements recorded in the proceedings included threats to make the officers pay for the police action, references to recovering Al-Andalus and threats to blow the officers up.

What was the outcome?

The National Court did not consider the terrorist-threat offence alleged by the prosecution to have been proven.

However, it did find an aggravated offence of public disorder.

The original sentence was reviewed on appeal and ultimately reduced to three years in prison for each defendant, according to published reports on the appeal.

Important qualification: the court should not be described as having found the two men to be members of a jihadist organisation or convicted them of terrorist threats. This was an episode of threats and intimidation against officers during an antiterrorism operation, but its judicial classification was different.

 

5.5. 2018–2019: Muntasir Media and the threat against magistrate José de la Mata

Named threat against a magistrate

Person threatened: José de la Mata, magistrate of the National Court.
Propaganda structure: Muntasir Media.

What was Muntasir Media?

Muntasir Media was a Spanish-language propaganda platform linked to the Islamic State milieu.

Its activity included videos, statements and intimidation messages aimed at Spanish-speaking users.

It was not an official organ of Daesh, but a propaganda structure supportive of the organisation.

Threats in December 2018 and January 2019

The National Court Prosecutor’s Office documented that the platform released videos on 21 December 2018, 2 January 2019 and 12 January 2019.

The content included direct threats against Spain and National Court magistrates.

One of the most serious messages concerned magistrate José de la Mata, who had been involved in investigations into jihadist terrorism.

The video, distributed under the title “You will die with a sticky bomb”, explicitly identified him as a target.

Police operation

On 5 October 2019, the National Police arrested a 23-year-old man of Moroccan origin in Parla (Madrid), whom investigators attributed with running Muntasir Media in Spain.

His home was searched.

The prosecution documented the discovery of a list of numerous Spanish people and infrastructures identified as targets, as well as chemical precursors and material related to the manufacture of explosives.

What was the outcome?

The detainee was remanded in custody.

The prosecution identified the proceedings as Preliminary Proceedings 62/19, joined to Proceedings 88/18.

The 2020 prosecutorial documentation continued to describe the investigation as proceedings aimed at identifying the people who had made the threats.

We have not located a public final judgment confirming the definitive outcome of the case.

Significance: this is one of the clearest examples of a named threat against a Spanish magistrate by a propaganda structure supportive of Daesh.

6. Fourth period (2014–2023): threats against witnesses, women and citizens critical of extremism

This period includes cases that do not necessarily fit the classic model of organised terrorism. Their significance lies in threats justified through extremist religious arguments and pressure on people who challenge certain ideological interpretations.

 

6.1. 2014–2023: Raquel Alonso and threats reported after she testified against the Al-Andalus Brigade

Threats reported by a witness

Person affected: Raquel Alonso.
Ex-husband convicted of terrorism: Nabil Benazzou.
Organisation: Al-Andalus Brigade.

Who is Raquel Alonso?

Raquel Alonso is a Spanish woman who was married to Nabil Benazzou for approximately two decades.

Her husband’s arrest in June 2014 radically changed her family situation.

Benazzou was part of the Al-Andalus Brigade, a jihadist structure devoted to recruitment, radicalisation, indoctrination, financing and sending volunteers to Syria.

What happened to her husband?

Nabil Benazzou was arrested in June 2014 along with other members of the cell.

In 2016, the National Court sentenced him to eight years in prison and fourteen years of absolute disqualification for membership of a terrorist organisation.

The judgment was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.

The case established his involvement in recruitment and radicalisation activities and in an attempt to send volunteers to Syria.

The threats reported by Raquel

Raquel Alonso cooperated with the judicial investigation and testified against the group in which her ex-husband had participated.

She subsequently reported threats, assaults and harassment which, according to her account, affected both her and her children.

In February 2022, RTVE published an interview in which she described her fear ahead of Benazzou’s release from prison.

She also explained that she had received death threats and feared for her children’s safety.

In June 2022, she again publicly reported assaults and attempts to kill her through dangerous manoeuvres involving vehicles on the road.

What is the relationship between the threats and her ex-husband?

This point must be treated with particular caution.

Benazzou’s conviction for membership of the Al-Andalus Brigade is judicially established.

The threats and assaults reported by Raquel form part of her testimony and of the measures taken in connection with her protection.

However, we have not located a judgment that judicially attributes all those threats to Benazzou or to identified members of the Al-Andalus Brigade.

What was the outcome?

Benazzou was released from prison in June 2022 after serving his eight-year sentence.

In family proceedings, the courts granted Raquel Alonso exclusive parental authority over her daughter, taking into account the father’s radicalisation process and its influence on the minors.

The case remains relevant to the protection of people who cooperate with the justice system in jihadist-terrorism proceedings.

It is important to investigate whether witness-protection mechanisms are sufficient when threats occur after a terrorist organisation has been dismantled.

6.2. 2020: arrest in Guadalix de la Sierra over threats against Spain and other countries

In June 2020, Spanish authorities arrested a Moroccan citizen in Guadalix de la Sierra (Madrid) for activities involving jihadist self-indoctrination and the dissemination of threats.

The investigation focused on his social-media profiles, where he disseminated propaganda supportive of the Islamic State and threatening messages against Spain, Israel and the United States.

The individual presented himself as a supporter of the Islamic State.

The police action sought to determine the seriousness of the threats and their possible connection with terrorist activities.

This case should be classified among general threats against states and populations, not as a threat directed at an identified individual.

The detainee was brought before the National Court. We have not located a public judicial ruling confirming a final conviction for these events.

 

6.3. 2022: death threats against Miss Raisa for defending the LGBTI community

Direct threat against a Muslim woman

Victim: Imane Raissali, known as Miss Raisa.
Location: Catalonia.
Investigation: Mossos d’Esquadra and the National Police.

Who is Miss Raisa?

Imane Raissali is a Muslim artist and rapper living in Catalonia.

In her public appearances, she addresses issues related to identity, religion, individual rights and coexistence.

In June 2022, she posted a video on TikTok defending respect for homosexual people and the LGBTI community.

One of her statements was that a person does not have to be homosexual in order to respect that community.

How did the threats begin?

After posting the video, she began receiving insults and intimidating messages.

One user went so far as to justify her murder and beheading through religious arguments.

The Mossos d’Esquadra investigation identified an individual living in Birmingham (United Kingdom) who had several social-media profiles on which he presented himself as a consultant and religious preacher.

Reports also mentioned previous offences involving hatred towards the LGBTI community and antisemitism.

The arrest

On 4 August 2022, the suspect was arrested at Madrid-Barajas Airport on arrival in Spain.

The National Police acted at the request of the Mossos d’Esquadra.

What was the outcome?

The detainee appeared before a judge and was released subject to precautionary measures.

These included:

• A ban on approaching Miss Raisa within 1,000 metres.
• A ban on communicating with her.
• Surrender of his passport.
• A prohibition on leaving Spain.
• Restrictions on Internet access while the proceedings were pending.

These measures are documented in judicial information reported by the media.

We have not located a final judgment confirming the ultimate outcome of the case.

Why is this case important?

The victim was a Muslim woman who publicly defended respect for the rights of homosexual people.

The threats were not directed at her because she had left Islam, but because she defended a position opposed to interpretations that justify discrimination and violence on religious grounds.

There is insufficient public evidence that the detainee formally belonged to Daesh, Al-Qaeda or another terrorist organisation. The case should therefore be classified as serious threats justified through extremist religious arguments, not as an operation by an established jihadist cell.

 

7. Fifth period (2023–2025): digital threats, target selection and new structures

7.1. 2023: the Campos case, Mallorca. Threats against police, military personnel and authorities

Threats for terrorist purposes investigated by the National Court

Location: Campos, Mallorca.
Person investigated: identity not officially published.
Groups threatened: police, military personnel and other authorities.

What happened?

On 10 March 2023, the National Police announced the arrest of an individual in Campos, Mallorca.

The investigation had begun in September 2022, when officers detected social-media profiles disseminating propaganda supportive of jihadism.

The detainee administered several accounts with hundreds of followers.

Through them, he disseminated threatening messages against different authorities, especially police and military personnel.

On his profiles, he described himself as a jihadist, mujahid and “soldier of Allah”.

What triggered the intervention?

According to the Interior Ministry, the posts had become progressively more radical, and one of the latest directly incited attacks against police officers.

The investigation also reconstructed his movements across several Spanish provinces and his trip to Egypt, from where he was expelled and returned to Spain.

What was the outcome?

The detainee was brought before Investigating Court No. 2 of the National Court.

The judge ordered pre-trial detention, without communication and without bail, on suspicion of threats for terrorist purposes and self-indoctrination.

We have not located a public final judgment confirming the outcome of the proceedings.

It is relevant that the police did not disclose his full identity.

 

7.2. 2024: direct threats against the Western population and the Jewish community

Collective threats by a jihadist structure

On 26 November 2024, the Interior Ministry announced a joint operation by the National Police and Moroccan security services that resulted in nine arrests.

Six people were arrested in Spain:

• Four in Ceuta.
• One in Ibiza.
• One in Madrid.

Three others were arrested in Morocco.

What threats were detected?

Investigators identified a group of highly radicalised people who used social media to disseminate jihadist propaganda and direct threats against the Western population and the Jewish community.

They also incited violent acts.

The investigation had begun in mid-2023.

The Interior Ministry described the structure as a real threat to security.

What was the outcome?

The six detainees in Spain appeared before the courts, and Central Investigating Court No. 1 ordered pre-trial detention for all of them.

No individual victims’ names have been published, and no final judgment has been located that would establish the criminal responsibility of each person under investigation.

Significance: this case shows that threats against groups, particularly the Jewish community, remain present in jihadist propaganda disseminated from Spain.

 

7.3. March 2025: a radical Pakistani organisation promotes killings and selects potential targets in Europe

Selection of potential targets

Location: Barcelona and its metropolitan area; operation also carried out in Italy.
Detainees: eleven people, ten in Catalonia and one in Piacenza (Italy).

This case deserves its own section because it introduces a form of collective threat and selection of potential victims that should be distinguished from Daesh propaganda.

What happened?

On 7 March 2025, the Interior Ministry announced a joint operation by the National Police, the Mossos d’Esquadra and the Italian Police.

Eleven arrests were made: ten in Barcelona and its metropolitan area and one in Italy.

This was the third phase of an investigation into a radical Pakistani organisation.

Arrests had already been made in Spain during the first two phases, in 2022 and 2023.

What activities did the organisation carry out?

According to the official information, the organisation had a hierarchical structure and used encrypted communication channels to distribute instructions promoting the murder and beheading of people it considered opposed to its doctrine.

It also glorified perpetrators of attacks in Europe and Pakistan against people accused of blasphemy.

Most relevant to this research, some of its members had already begun identifying people in Europe as potential targets of violent actions.

Are the names of the people threatened known?

No.

The authorities did not publish the names or locations of the people identified.

Nor was a public list of the possible victims released.

What happened judicially?

The National Police reported that the operation had taken place on 3 March 2025.

Eleven people were arrested and seven were brought before the National Court.

According to available reports, four were remanded in custody and three were released subject to precautionary measures.

We have not located a public final judgment establishing the ultimate outcome of the proceedings.

A clarification about its ideology

The Interior Ministry described the structure as a radical Pakistani terrorist organisation.

It should not automatically be equated with Daesh or Al-Qaeda. Its ideological profile and repertoire of religious violence must be analysed separately.

Significance: this is one of the most relevant cases of 2025 because the police investigation identified prior actions to select potential targets in Europe, although the authorities have not made the names of the people singled out public.

7.4. May 2025: Operation Himon in Castelldefels and Montcada i Reixac

Specific threats against several people

Locations:

• Castelldefels.
• Montcada i Reixac.

People arrested: three individuals whose identities were not officially disclosed.

What happened?

On 2 May 2025, the Interior Ministry announced a joint operation by the National Police and the Mossos d’Esquadra that resulted in three arrests in the province of Barcelona.

Two people were arrested in Castelldefels and one in Montcada i Reixac.

The investigation was conducted under the direction of Central Investigating Court No. 5 and the National Court Prosecutor’s Office.

What threats were detected?

Investigators discovered that the detainees were highly active on social media, where they disseminated jihadist propaganda and justified attacks by terrorist organisations such as Daesh.

One of them had reached a level of radicalisation which, according to the Interior Ministry, led him to make specific threats against several people through different accounts and profiles.

During the searches, officers seized electronic devices, a bayonet and handwritten material referring to attacks carried out by individuals acting alone and to martyrdom.

Are the victims’ names known?

No.

The official statement did not identify the people threatened or explain their relationship with the suspects.

What was the outcome?

The three detainees appeared before a judge, and Central Investigating Court No. 5 ordered pre-trial detention for all three.

We have not located a final judgment establishing the ultimate outcome of the proceedings.

This case is particularly relevant because it directly concerns two municipalities in the Barcelona metropolitan area and documents threats against specific people, even though their identities have not been made public.

 

8. Comparative analysis: who have the main targets been?

The documentation makes it possible to classify the threats by the groups affected.

People and groups singled out in the documented cases

Political leaders (2003–2015)
Mariano Rajoy, Esperanza Aguirre, José María Aznar and Javier Solana.

Judges and magistrates (2005–2019)
Javier Gómez Bermúdez and José de la Mata, along with other magistrates of the National Court.

Researchers, journalists and teachers (2016–2019)
Fernando Reinares and people from the academic and journalistic circles mentioned in Operation GRIN.

Police and military personnel (2015–2023)
The National Police, the Civil Guard and other security officials.

Women and citizens critical of extremism (2014–2023)
Raquel Alonso and Imane Raissali (Miss Raisa).

Western populations and religious communities (2020–2025)
The Western population, the Jewish community and people identified as opposed to certain extremist doctrines.

This classification shows that threats are not limited to state institutions.

They can also target people exercising freedom of expression, religious autonomy or individual rights.

8.1. Politicians

The cases involving Aznar, Solana, Rajoy and Aguirre show that political figures can be singled out because of their institutional responsibilities or association with foreign-policy decisions.

However, there is a difference between Almaliki’s online list of targets and the letter sent to the People’s Party: the former was a public propaganda-based designation of targets; the latter contained written threats addressed to specific political figures.

8.2. Judges

The 2005 cases and Muntasir Media are particularly significant.

In both, the threats were linked to judicial proceedings against members of jihadist organisations.

Intimidation of magistrates can have an effect beyond personal safety: it seeks to challenge judicial independence through the threat of reprisals.

8.3. Researchers and journalists

The case involving Fernando Reinares raises an important question about the safety of people who research jihadist terrorism.

However, the acquittal requires particular precision: the police investigation did not establish Karim El Idrissi Soussi’s authorship of the alleged threats to the judicial standard of proof.

8.4. Muslim women and people critical of extremism

The cases of Raquel Alonso and Miss Raisa reflect two different situations.

In the first, a woman cooperated with the justice system against her husband, who had been convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, and later reported threats and assaults.

In the second, a Muslim woman defended respect for the LGBTI community and received serious threats based on religious arguments.

 

9. Names appearing in this research

An important point for this research is to retain a list of documented names and surnames without filling in identities that are not public.

People threatened or singled out

Arrested or convicted people publicly identified

In other cases, the identities of those arrested have not been fully published or have only been disclosed through initials.

 

10. What do we know about the judicial outcomes?

One conclusion is important: the number of people arrested or investigated is not the same as the number convicted of making threats.

The cases of Aoulad Chiba, Karim El Idrissi and Melilla show why investigated facts must be distinguished from facts declared proven by a court.

 

11. How threats changed between 2000 and 2025

The historical analysis makes it possible to identify four periods.

11.1. First period: Al-Qaeda propaganda threats (2000–2010)

The main features of this period were:

• Communiqués and videos distributed internationally.
• Threats against Spain because of its foreign policy.
• Warnings against judges who convicted Al-Qaeda members.
• Territorial claims relating to Al-Andalus, Ceuta and Melilla.

Threats were disseminated mainly through communiqués, recordings and websites linked to propaganda structures.

11.2. Second period: naming targets (2011–2013)

The cases of Aoulad Chiba, Almaliki and Echaabi show a shift towards:

• More intensive use of digital forums.
• Circulation of target lists.
• Publication of manuals and propaganda material.
• Investigations into possible attacks against specific people or groups.

Propaganda activity and preparations for possible violent actions increasingly appeared alongside one another.

11.3. Third period: Daesh and Spanish-language propaganda (2014–2019)

The expansion of Daesh changed the dissemination of threats.

Platforms specialising in Spanish-language content, such as Muntasir Media, appeared.

Threats increasingly targeted:

• Specific people.
• Magistrates.
• Researchers.
• Politicians.
• Professional groups.
• Infrastructure.

Distribution through social networks and digital channels widened the audience and facilitated the identification of targets.

11.4. Fourth period: individual threats and target selection (2020–2025)

Several phenomena can be observed during this period:

• Individual threats posted through personal profiles.
• Messages targeting police and military personnel.
• Threats against Muslims who defend positions opposed to extremism.
• Threats against religious communities.
• Organisations using encrypted channels to promote violence.
• Prior identification of people as potential targets.

The Campos and Miss Raisa cases, the 2024 operation and the two 2025 operations make it possible to study this development.

Nevertheless, we cannot infer that there is organisational continuity between all these cases.

 

12. Limitations of the research and cases requiring further verification

There are three issues that must be highlighted before publication.

First: the absence of a single public register.

There is no public database that brings together all jihadist-related threats reported in Spain since 2000.

Some judicial proceedings are not published in full, and in other cases the victims’ identities are protected.

Second: incomplete judicial outcomes.

In several cases, we have been able to reconstruct the arrest and pre-trial detention but have not located a final judgment.

These gaps must not be filled with assumptions.

Third: ideological attribution.

Not all threats justified through religious arguments come from a jihadist organisation. The Miss Raisa and Raquel Alonso cases require us to distinguish the victims’ testimony, the ideology attributed to the perpetrators and the courts’ findings.

 

13. General conclusions

The cases documented between 2000 and 2025 support seven conclusions.

1. Jihadist threats against people in Spain predate Daesh. Al-Qaeda’s threat against National Court judges in 2005 and the targeting of Aznar and Solana in 2012 show that clear precedents existed before the proclamation of the caliphate.
2. Judicial and police institutions have been recurring targets. Magistrates, police officers and military personnel appear at different stages of the research as recipients of threats.
3. Political leaders have also been singled out. The Almaliki case and the letter sent to the PP show two different methods: propaganda target lists and written threats addressed to political figures.
4. Researchers and journalists can become targets of intimidation. Operation GRIN and the Muntasir Media case show that research into jihadist terrorism can place media, academic and judicial professionals in the line of fire.
5. Threats do not come exclusively from structured terrorist organisations. Radicalised individuals also use the Internet to threaten specific people.
6. Muslim women and citizens who challenge extremism are a relevant research area. Miss Raisa and Raquel Alonso are two very different examples of victims who reported intimidation connected with extremist ideological environments.
7. Transparency about the judicial course of threat cases needs to improve. In several cases, it has not been possible to locate a final judgment. This makes it difficult to establish how many threats ended in convictions, dismissals or acquittals.

 

14. Editorial perspective

The cases examined raise an issue that deserves broader public debate: the use of threats of violence to restrict individual rights, professional activity and participation in public life.

Threats against judges, researchers, journalists, Muslim women and witnesses in counterterrorism proceedings should not be analysed solely from a policing perspective.

They also affect freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, judicial independence and the protection of fundamental rights.

A liberal democracy cannot allow fear of reprisals to determine what a researcher may publish, what a woman may say, what a citizen may believe or what a journalist may investigate.

Rigorous documentation of these threats, together with monitoring the related judicial proceedings, is a matter of public interest.

Threats must not become a mechanism of social censorship.

CONAGORA | RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

Period covered: 2000–2025.

 

Main documentary sources

This research gives priority to institutional and judicial sources, supplemented by media outlets that have published information about the people involved and the cases.

Official sources

1. State Prosecutor General’s Office. Annual reports of the National Court Prosecutor’s Office, especially 2014, 2017 and 2020.
2. Ministry of the Interior. Announcements of counterterrorism operations between 2020 and 2025.
3. General Council of the Judiciary. National Court annual reports and judicial documentation.
4. Official State Gazette. Available legislation and judicial rulings.

News sources

5. El País. Reporting on threats against judges, politicians and researchers, and on police operations.
6. RTVE. Reporting on the letter to the PP, Raquel Alonso and other threats.
7. Europa Press. Coverage of arrests and judicial proceedings.
8. elDiario.es. Reporting on threats against Miss Raisa.
9. Group of Strategic Studies (GEES). Historical analysis of propaganda and threats against Spain by jihadist organisations.